To avert war, the West must shatter the mirror by which it views China

In the shadow of escalating tensions between the United States and China, Graham Allison’s concept of the Thucydides Trap has become a staple of geopolitical discourse. Coined by the Harvard scholar, the term evokes the ancient Greek historian Thucydides’ observation that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable”.

Allison’s study of 16 historical cases, where a rising power challenged a ruling one, found war in 12 instances. He warns that China’s ascent threatens American hegemony, potentially dooming both to conflict unless deliberate efforts are made to avert it.

Yet, this framework is itself a conceptual trap for the West. By drawing from the histories of the West and Japan, Allison projects onto China a narrative of inevitable aggression. This is like gazing into a mirror: the West sees only its own reflection of historical conquest and rivalry – from European empires to Japanese imperialism – concluding that China, as it gains strength, will behave similarly.

But China’s 5,000-year history tells a different story. Its cultural DNA is profoundly land-bound, shaped by geography and ecology. For much of history, Chinese civilisation has thrived within the 400-millimetre annual rainfall isohyet, the climatic threshold separating fertile agricultural heartlands from arid steppes.

This line, roughly aligning with the path of China’s Great Wall, demarcates zones where rainfall exceeds 400 mm per year, sufficient for stable crop yields, and the drier northern regions, suited largely for nomadic herding. South of this boundary, wheat fields and rice paddies sustained vast populations, fostering a society incentivised to defend its productive core rather than venture into marginal lands.

Northern steppe peoples roamed the grasslands, chasing scarce water and forage. Their survival depended on mobility and raiding, inevitably leading to clashes with other nomadic tribes. The Xiongnu, Mongols and other steppe peoples repeatedly made southward incursions, prompting a defensive response from China in the form of fortification and counter-attacks.

South China Morning Post