China’s Global Security Initiative, launched last February, aims to maintain security, sovereignty and territorial integrity through dialogue while supporting security cooperation that centres the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and opposing nuclear war. So far, in Southeast Asia, the initiative has been supported by Brunei, Cambodia and Laos.
To expand support, China has increased its military profile in Malaysia with a defence dialogue and the sale of arms, including littoral mission ships. China also held more defence dialogues with Vietnam in 2021 than the US did. And in just five years, China has expanded its defence ties with Indonesia by 14 points on the Lowy index to reach 45 points.
Chinese naval vessels, seen on April 26, going to Singapore for a bilateral maritime exercise from April 28 to May 1. Photo: Weibo
To address regional security challenges, China has signalled its willingness to sign a protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. Given that China seeks political stability in its investment destinations, which includes law enforcement and the protection of its overseas workers and contractors, it also provides support to enhance state capacity and policing powers in countries that struggle in these areas.
Myanmar’s ruling junta has reportedly sought China’s help to monitor internet use in the country to capture dissidents. Laos and China have agreed to enhance security to guarantee the Belt and Road Initiative’s success. And Cambodia and China have pledged to cooperate on addressing political security risks and enhancing law enforcement capabilities.
China is poised to bolster its military partnerships in Southeast Asia. In this, it is supported by two factors but also has one daunting obstacle to overcome.
For a start, China enjoys strong economic ties with Southeast Asia, with trade between the two approaching US$1 trillion last year. This compares with US-Asean trade of US$442 billion in 2021.
China has invested significantly in the region’s transport and energy infrastructure. Vietnam’s supply chains rely heavily on China for raw materials. The Philippines has looked to China for its energy and infrastructure needs. Indonesia seeks synergy with China to become a global maritime hub. And Malaysia recently signed US$38 billion in deals with Chinese companies; last year, China replaced the US and Singapore as the top investor in Malaysia.
In contrast, the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework appears to lack substance when it comes to providing Southeast Asian exports with reduced tariffs or easy access to the American market. Without complementing its security engagements with economic cooperation, the US may lose ground to China. Southeast Asian countries may eventually prioritise their energy and infrastructure needs over their security concerns about China.
Another factor favouring China is the internal division among Southeast Asian states over maritime disputes in the South China Sea, and the lack of focus on Asean centrality and of consensus in dealing with major powers.
Singapore’s defence minister recently welcomed Australia’s expanding security role in the Indo-Pacific, including facilitating port calls for its nuclear-powered submarines in the future. Other Asean members might not support this – Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam have concerns over the risk of nuclear proliferation in the region.
Meanwhile, the recent US-Philippine joint military drills involving more than 17,000 soldiers signify a shift in Manila’s policy towards the US. China has expressed concerns over this and cautioned the Philippines against increasing regional tensions by interfering in its internal matters with Taiwan.
The shift also faced domestic opposition in the Philippines and might go against the Asean principles of consensus and centrality – the bloc will not support an escalation of conflict in the region.
Finally, the negative element that undercuts the expansion of Beijing’s defence partnerships with Southeast Asian countries is its rejection of the 2016 South China Sea arbitration verdict. This, and China’s actions in their exclusive economic zones, means Southeast Asian nations tend to remain distrustful of it.
Maritime incidents impede defence cooperation and fuel anti-China sentiment. As long as their claims in the South China Sea remain unresolved, Southeast Asian countries will welcome the US military to balance against China’s hegemony.
To avoid increased military activity in the region, Southeast Asian countries should form a consensus around arrangements on military bases and joint exercises to reduce military tensions and strengthen the bloc’s military position. The best remedy is a binding code of conduct in the South China Sea and a compromise on territorial claims.
Riaz Khokhar is a policy associate at the Center for Regional and Global Connectivity at Tabadlab, Islamabad